缅甸

　　Chinese takeaway kitchen

　　中国的外卖厨房

　　Three articles look at China’s influence in South-East Asia: first;resentment in Myanmar;second, Cambodian rivalries; third, Banyan on the strategic implications

　　三篇文章都关注了中国在东南亚的影响问题：第一篇，缅甸之怨；第二篇，柬埔寨的对抗；第三篇是Banyan专栏关于战略意义的一篇文章。

　　WAIST-DEEP in the muddy water, hundreds ofpeople swirl their pans, scouring the black sediment for the sparkle of golddust. They have come from all over Myanmar to Kachin state, where the N’Mai andMali rivers merge to form the mighty Irrawaddy, knowing that a good day mayyield $1,000-worth of gold—and that time for gold-panning is running out.

　　在缅甸的克钦邦，恩梅开江和迈立开江交会成为浩荡的伊洛瓦底江。在齐腰深的浑浊的江水中，可以见到数百名淘金者晃动淘选盘，在黑色的沉淀物中仔细搜寻闪闪发光的金粒。这些人是从全国各地来到克钦邦的，他们知道，如果幸运的话，一天的淘金收入可以达到1000美金，但他们也清楚，淘金的时日已然不多。

　　Across the river, the corrugated-iron roofsof a prefabricated barracks glint in the midday sun. They house hundreds ofChinese labourers working on the Myitsone hydropower project. This, accordingto Myanmar’sgovernment, will be the sixth highest dam in the world, and generate 6,000MW ofelectricity a year. On completion in 2019, the dam will flood thegold-prospecting area and displace more than 10,000 people. All the electricitywill be exported to China.All the revenue will go to Myanmar’sgovernment. If an environmental and social impact study was conducted at all,it did not involve consulting the affected villagers.

　　在江对面，预制棚屋的波形铁皮屋顶在正午阳光的照耀下闪闪发光。在那些屋子里寓居着数百名修建密松水电站的中国劳工。缅甸政府表示，该水电站的大坝高程位列世界第六，每年能够发电6000兆瓦。2019年工程竣工后，大坝周边的金矿勘探地区将被淹没，并且还要转移1000人到其他地区。所有的电能将被输送到中国，而所有的收入将统统流入缅甸政府的钱袋。即使他们真地做了环境和社会影响研究的话，但那也并未涉及征询受影响村民意见的环节。

　　A local Catholic priest who led prayersagainst the dam says his parishioners were moved to a “model” village, intotiny houses on plots too small for cultivation. The letters of concern he sentto Myanmar’sleaders went unanswered. He says he will stay in his historic church “till thewaters rise over the doorstep”.

　　当地的一个天主教神父曾组织过祷告活动，以抗议修建大坝，他表示他的教区居民被迁移到一个“模范”村，那里的房子非常小，而且房子周围的土地也很少，根本不适合耕种。他寄给缅甸领导人反映问题的信件，至今仍然未予回复。他表示他将呆在的那座历史上著名的教堂中，直到江水没过门阶。

　　Those displaced are not the only onesworrying about the project. The project abuts territory controlled by theKachin Independence Organisation (KIO), one of a plethora of ethnicinsurgencies that have battled the central government for decades. Last yearseveral bombs exploded at the dam site and in May the KIO warned that if thedam were not stopped it would lead to civil war. The KIO’s armed wing recentlyengaged in skirmishes with government forces, despite a notional ceasefire.

　　那些移民并非只是对该工程表示担忧的唯一群体。该工程的毗邻地区处在克钦独立组织（KIO）的控制之下，而在过去几十年中，众多部落叛军团体纷纷与中央政府为敌，这个组织只是其中的一员。去年，数枚炸弹在坝址引爆，五月份克钦独立组织（KIO）又警告说，如果大坝不停工，将引发内战。尽管在名义上已经达成停火，但克钦独立组织（KIO）的武装派别近来多次与政府军发生小规模冲突。

　　The KIO was banned from last year’selection in Myanmarbecause it refused to let its fighters join the government’s “border securityforce”. Its threat came as Myanmar’snewly installed “civilian” president, Thein Sein, a former general, embarked ona state visit to China.

　　克钦独立组织（KIO）被禁止参加去年的缅甸大选，因为它拒绝让自己的士兵加入政府组建的“边防安全部队”。当缅甸新近当选的“平民”总统登盛（以前做过将军）开始访问中国时，克钦独立组织（KIO）就蠢蠢欲动了。

　　China has a big stake in Myanmar.It is the country’s leading foreign investor. Myitsone is one of manyhydropower, mining and infrastructure projects there. China’s mostambitious undertaking is a new deep-sea port for oil tankers. Due forcompletion in 2013, it will take gas from Myanmar’soffshore Shwe field and will have the capacity to satisfy 10% of China’soil-import needs.

　　中国在缅甸拥有重大利益，是该国重要的外国投资者。密松水电站是中国在那里修建的众多水电站、矿产和基础设施工程之一。其中，中国所承揽的最为雄心勃勃的工程是一个深海油轮码头，它将在2013年竣工，届时它将负责转运缅甸近海丹瑞气田的天然气，而且将能够满足10%的中国石油进口需求。

　　These close ties are not entirelycomfortable for either side. Between 1mand 2m Chinese citizens have movedinto northern Myanmar.They dominate the jade-and-gem trade, push up land prices and flaunt theirwealth in Mandalayand Myitkyina, where all the posh cars have Chinese number plates. Localresentment is growing. Church leaders in Myitkyina say Chinese people make upmore than half the population. Many Burmese say their northern states are likea Chinese province.

　　这些紧密联系没有让双方完全满意。有一百万到二百万中国人已经迁移到了缅甸北部。在曼德勒和密支那，他们垄断了玉石贸易，推高了土地价格，还经常炫耀自己的财富。在这两个城市，所有的豪华车都挂着中国的车牌。当地人的怨气变得越来越大。密支那的宗教领袖表示，中国人占当地人口的多一半。许多缅甸人都说，他们的北部各邦俨然就是中国的一个省份。

　　China,for its part, worries about the security of its investments and people. In thepast it has leaned on Myanmar’sleaders to prevent fighting between the army and the ethnic insurgencies. Whenconflict broke out in 2009 with the Kokang, an ethnic-Han-Chinese minority,37,000 people fled to China,provoking sharp criticism of the Burmese junta.

　　中国方面则担心其投资和人员的安全。在过去，中国一直依赖缅甸领导人来阻止军队和部落叛军之间的冲突。在2009年，当少数族裔汉族与果敢爆发冲突时，37000人逃往中国，缅甸军政府受到强烈批评。

　　As its economic interests have grown, China has pressed for more access to Myanmar’sharbours and territorial waters, to monitor the security of the new port andpipelines, and to keep an eye out for pirates. But this is a neuralgic issuefor a country with a deep-seated suspicion of its powerful northern neighbour.

　　随着经济利益不断增长，中国也迫切要求从缅甸获得更多的港口和领海的使用权，以监控新码头和管线的安全，并密切注视海盗的行踪。但是对于一个对其强大的北部邻国拥有根深蒂固的疑虑的国家来说，这无疑是一个令人大伤脑筋的问题。

　　Myanmar’s xenophobic leaders are trying to reduce their dependence on China by playing it off against Indiaand the West. But India hasbeen slow in trying to gain a toehold, while Americaand the European Union have recently extended sanctions on Myanmar. Theseinclude America’sembargo on backing loans from the World Bank, which would impose higherenvironmental and other standards on big infrastructure projects such asMyitsone.

　　缅甸仇外的领导人试图在中国与印度和西方国家之间挑拨离间，以减少对中国的依赖。但是印度在设法获得立脚点方面动作迟缓，而美国和欧盟却在近来延长了对缅甸的制裁期限。制裁措施中包括美国限制缅甸从世行获得支持贷款的禁令，这将令大型基建工程如密松水坝不得不接受更为苛刻的环境和其他标准。

　　So the regime is being drawn into China’sorbit as much from necessity as choice. That does not make China any morepopular. In the words of an old Burmese monk: “We are China’skitchen. They take what they like and leave us with the rubbish.”

　　所以缅甸被纳入中国的毂中，这既出于形势发展需要，又是自己审慎的选择。而中国并未因此而受到多少欢迎，用一个缅甸的老和尚的话说就是：“我们是中国的厨房，他们任取所需，而留给我们的只有垃圾”。